This post was written by Maggie Mahar and Niko Karvounis
In 1980 Ronald Reagan claimed the presidency and America headed in a new, sharply more conservative direction. It is no accident that this also was the year that “the corporatization of health care” in America began in earnest. This was the phrase that Paul Starr would use in his Pulitzer-prize-winning The Social Transformation of American Medicine to describe a revolution that would turn U.S. healthcare into an enormous for-profit business.
Thanks to changes in tax laws, for-profit HMOs would begin to replace not-for-profit HMOs, and for-profit hospitals would begin to flourish. By 1986 for-profits had captured 14 percent of the nation’s acute-care hospital market. In this brave new world, more and more hospitals would be run, not physicians but by businessmen. After all, as Fortune magazine had declared some years earlier: “the management of medical care was too important to be left to doctors.” Some physicians began to see themselves as entrepreneurs. “Those who talked about ‘health care planning” in the 1970s now talk about “health care marketing,” Starr wrote in 1982. “Instead of public planning, there will be corporate planning.” And the goal driving that planning, Starr suggested, would no longer be better health, but rather “the rate of return on investments.”
Against that backdrop, in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, and the face of medical research in America was forever altered. The bill would bring academic institutions into the commercial world in a way that, at the time, seemed to ensure medical progress. Nature magazine offers a concise overview of the legislation, explaining that it “shifted the incentive structure that governed research and [the] development . . . of federally funded [medical] inventions by allowing institutions to own inventions resulting from federally sponsored research and to exclusively license those inventions.” In other words, after Bayh-Dole, a university research team that came up with a drug could patent it and sell it to businesses.
This may seem hard to imagine today, but before Bayh-Dole, there was no such collaboration between those who invented a drug and for-profit companies. Federally-funded research was considered a public good, owned by everybody and nobody. If, say, Doctor A created a breakthrough cancer drug at Harvard, Doctor B at Stanford had free reign to experiment with it as needed to improve it—as did other academics. There were no significant legal hurdles to open, ongoing collaboration and little profit attached to research.
