The Health IT Scandal the NY Times Didn’t Cover

Below, a guest-post by Michael L. Millenson, president of Health Quality Advisors LLC.  An early, and vocal quality-of-care evangelical, Millenson is the author of the critically acclaimed book, Demanding Medical Excellence: Doctors and Accountability in the Information Age.

As health information technology honchos gather for the annual HIMSS trade show and schmoozefest, it’s a safe bet the industry “scandal” the New York Times placed on page one recently will breed more bored yawns than buzz. The real scandal in health IT involves the customers, not just the vendors, but that’s a topic for quiet conversations journalists can’t cover.

In case you missed it, the shocking news was that health IT companies that stood to profit from billions of dollars in federal subsidies to potential customers poured in ­– well, actually, poured in not that much money at all when you think about it ­– lobbying for passage of the HITECH Act in 2009. This, putatively, explains why electronic health records (EHRs) have thus far failed to dramatically improve quality and lower cost, with a secondary explanation from athenahealth CEO Jonathan Bush that everything would be much better if the HITECH rules had been written by Jonathan Bush of athenahealth.

Next up: corporate lobbying for passage of the 1862 Pacific Railroad Bill is blamed for Amtrak’s dismal on-time record in 2013.

The actual scandal is more complicated and scary.  It has to do with the adamant refusal by hospitals and doctors to adopt electronic records no matter what the evidence. Way back in 1971, for example, when Intel was a mere fledgling and Microsoft and Apple weren’t even gleams in their founders’ eyes, a study in a high-profile medical journal found that doctors missed up to 35 percent of the data in a paper chart. Thirty-seven years later, when Intel, Microsoft and Apple were all corporate giants, a study in the same journal of severely ill coronary syndrome patients found virtually the same problem: “essential” elements to quality care missing in the paper record.

That clinical evidence and the way in which the world outside medicine had been transformed by computers did almost nothing to change health care. Computerized medical records were available: before there was “Watson,” the IBM computer helping doctors make decisions, there was “Watson,” the IBM chairman, vainly trying to sell electronic records to doctors as early as 1965. But well into the 21st century, most providers only trusted computers to send out the bills.
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