Over the next few years, drug makers are likely to face many new challenges, including government approved importation of cheaper drugs, Medicare negotiating for lower prices, stricter regulations of direct-to-consumer advertising, and (hopefully) a more robust FDA under the Obama Administration. With so many changes afoot, Big Pharma will have to evolve or suffer the consequences. Even drug executives see the need for a restructuring of the industry. Earlier this month, the head of pharmaceuticals at Roche told reporters that the “marginally-different-and-market-it-like-hell model [of prescription drugs] is over.” But if that’s true, then what new model will take its place—and will it be any less troubling?
Winds of Change
One of the biggest indicators that change is on the horizon is the fact that spending on prescription drugs isn’t what it used to be. In fact, according to a recent Health Affairs article authored by Murray Aitken of the consulting firm IMS Health, Ernst Berndy of MIT’s Sloan school and David Cutler of Harvard, sales are beginning to level off. Though “U.S. spending on prescription drugs grew 9.9 percent annually between 1997 and 2007,” since 2003 “growth rates have declined rapidly”—to their slowest since 1974—“and in 2007 spending grew but 1.6 percent” after growing by 8.5 percent in 2006—the first decline in spending growth on record.
A major reason behind the slow-down is that drug makers are simply running out of new drugs to sell. Aitken et al. note that, “according to the FDA, between 1999 and 2001 the average total number of…new product approvals was about thirty-five per year, whereas between 2005 and 2007 this number fell to about twenty.” And as time goes on, newer drugs comprise a smaller share of drug sales: “Products introduced within the prior five years accounted for 34 percent of total drug sales in 1999” but “that share has declined steadily since then, to just 19 percent of total sales in 2007.”
Fewer new drugs mean fewer new patents, which limits drug makers’ ability to keep revenues high through monopolistic pricing. Over time, the value of brand-name drugs on the cusp of losing their patents—and thus becoming vulnerable to competition from cheaper generics—has almost doubled, “from an average of about $9 billion per year between 2002 and 2005 to about $16 billion in 2006-07.” Health Affairs points out that “the list of drugs losing patent protection in recent years has been substantial: Norvasc (value: $2.6 billion), Lotrel ($1.5 billion), and Flonase ($1.2 billion). Moreover, drugs likely to come off patent protection soon include Cozaar in 2010; Lipitor, Plavix, and Seroquel in 2011; and Diovan, Viagra, and Evista in 2012.
When drug makers lose blockbusters—that is, drugs with sales of $1 billion or more—they take a big hit. A 2004 BusinessWeek article cited a Boston Consulting Group study which estimated that “80% of growth for the 10 biggest drug makers during the last decade came from the eight or so blockbusters a year launched during the 1990s.” Aitken et al. note that “spending on blockbusters increased from about 12 percent of all sales in 1996 to almost half of all sales in 2006, accounting for three-quarters of prescription drug spending growth over the same time period.” Unfortunately for drug companies, blockbusters are on the decline: “in 2007, for the first time, the number of billion-dollar products fell—from fifty-two to forty-eight—and their share of all sales also fell slightly, to 44 percent.” More bad news for pharma: “As more blockbusters go off patent and fewer new ones are developed, the share of sales attributable to blockbuster molecules will likely decline still further.” In other words, drug companies need to find a new cash cow. But where to look?
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